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# FROM MEMO TO TUTUALA
## A kaleidoscope of environmental problems in East Timor[1]

by:
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In response to a request last month from the chair of the Special Unit on Environment of the Satya Wacana Christian University (UKSW), I will "share" the environmental problems which I investigated during a visit to East Timor from 28 June to 9 July this year. First of all, taking into account their degree of importance, the time I spent on field work, and the limitations on my own time and resources, this paper will only discuss the environmental problems that I investigated while I was in East Timor.[2]

My second point is that, as I understand it, "environmental problems" are not restricted to matters relating to biological and non-human natural resources but also encompass the disruption to sustainable living for the indigenous East Timorese.

Thirdly, as befits an investigator and scientist, I will not confine my reflections on the environmental problems in the Island of Timor to my field observations while I was there but will complement this with a study of the literature about the island that I have collected here in Indonesia, in East Timor[3], in the U.S. during my periods of study there (1981-82, 1987-1989, 1991-1992) and in Lisbon, Portugal when I attended the Fifth Symposium on East Timor that was held by Oporto University from 22 - 29 July this year.

In my opinion, there are five main environmental problems "plaguing" the land of Loro Sae. First, the environmental impact of the war that has been waged for the past 18 years to crush the liberation struggle there. Second, the impact of large tracts of land owned by old and new absentee owners/controllers of land. Third, the impact of the official transmigration programme and the flood of spontaneous migration from Indonesia following the era of the open war. Fourth, the impact of the programme of guided villages and the construction of houses by territorial battalions in East Timor. Fifth, the potential impact of the planned exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap. In this paper, I will examine briefly these five environment problems.

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As we all know, the official version which has been (must be) disseminated by the Indonesian mass media since October 1975 is that only civilian Indonesian volunteers were asked to help anti-communist groups in East Timor to liberate the Portuguese colony from domination by Fretilin which was portrayed as an extreme communist group supported by elements in the Portuguese colonial army. The true facts have fortunately now begun to emerge for the Indonesian public. The weekly journal *Tempo* in its edition of 5 December 1992 published a documentary photograph on page 28 with the following caption: "ABRI troops landing in East Timor (1975)"[4]

The January issue of *Angkasa* published a report illustrated with colour photographs on pages 39 - 42 describing how Indonesia purchased 16 OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft from the U.S. to destroy the Fretilin liberation movement (1976 to 1979). According to the journal, these aircraft are capable of carrying a variety of weapons, including napalm, which suggests that reports that have appeared the media and have been made by foreign observers about the use of napalm bombs in East Timor [see

Taylor, 1991:204] are likely to be true.

Two sources whom I interviewed in East Timor, told me, without my even asking them, about a type of bomb that generated enough heat to melt the windows and glassware in the convent and that burnt human flesh. If this is so, it is likely that herbicides used as defoliants such as *Agent Orange* which was used in Vietnam [Weisberg 1970; Galstone, 1971; Wilcox, 1989] were also used in East Timor, as foreign commentators have surmised [Human Rights, 1977: 63; Taylor, 1991:85]. This was also confirmed by a participant at the Symposium recently held by Oporto University in Estoril.

During my recent visit to East Timor, I encountered a "silent witness" of the ferocity of the war in December 1975, the former complex of "Our Lady Fatima Seminary" [*Nossa Senhora de Fatima*] which was almost totally destroyed by bombardment from sea and land on 13 December 1975. The destruction of that seminary was reported in 1979 by an Indonesian Jesuit, Alex Dirdja, in *Inter–Nos*, the house journal of his order.

The environmental impact of the war can be divided into direct and indirect consequences. The direct impact is the human casualties, on the Indonesian side, and to a far greater extent, on the side of the East Timorese people. From December 1975 to August 1976, five hundred Indonesian soldiers were killed and 2,000 were seriously wounded. The number of casualties on the East Timor side is far in excess of this. According to U.S. political scientist J. William Liddle, sixty thousand men, women and children, or about ten per cent of the population of East Timor, were killed in the fighting or as a result of war–related deprivations during the first two months of this terrible war [1992:22].

The death toll among the East Timorese quickly escalated during the succeeding years. During the first three years of the war, the population in the territory fell from 688,771 in 1974 to 329,271 in October 1978. What happened to the shortfall of 359,500 people? About 4,000 people went into exile in Portugal and Australia in 1975–1976. A large number of people were forced to flee or went voluntarily into the forests or went up into the mountains with Fretilin, as a result of which they could not be included in the army's census.

But quite apart from the problems plaguing the census, anecdotal accounts point to an exceedingly high death toll. According to Alex Dirdja, an Indonesian Jesuit priest who was in East Timor in the month of March 1979, the Maubisse village in the district of Ainaro which had a population of 9,607 in 1976, had lost 5,021 inhabitants. The priest sometimes had to bury four people in a single day [1979:23].

[Tables]

Another direct consequence was the fall in rice production, in the number of cattle, in coffee output and other natural resources. The overall output of agricultural crops fell from 42,100 tons in 1973 to 12,600 tons in 1976. The rice output alone fell during the same period from 25,200 tons to 8,000 tons [Soesastro,1991:210]. After three years of open warfare, the number of cattle in East Timor fell dramatically [see Table 1]. The output and export of coffee, which was East Timor's leading crop also fell drastically [see Table 2].[5]

There have been many indirect consequences of the war in East Timor. The most important of all is the fostering of a culture of violence in the territory. This culture of violence which reached its zenith with the massacre of 271 young people at the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili on 12 November 1991, fostered the "intel culture" in East Timor. What is meant here is the emergence of an appalling habit among East Timorese of spying on their compatriots, trying to solve the conflicts between them by making – often false – reports about the activities of their rivals to the security forces in East Timor [Neonbasu, 1992:36,38].[6]

This culture of violence, or perhaps more correct, this culture of intimidation, has given birth to a new

vocabulary in East Timor. Informants who are native East Timorese are nicknamed *bufo* (from the days of PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) or Mau'hu (a new term that has come into being during Indonesian rule). As a way of intimidating people who oppose the government, a number of new expressions have been created which are strongly associated with the methods of execution and torture employed during the first five years of war in East Timor, such as "*mandi laut*" (bathing in the sea) in Dili, "*(jalan-jalan ke) Jakarta Baru*" ("taking a trip to New Jakarta"); "*piknik ke Bullino*" (going on a picnic to Bullino) in Ainaro"; "*menghinap di Hotel Flamboyan*" (staying the night in Hotel Flamboyan) in Baucau, and others.

Besides the linguistic dimension, there is also a gender dimension to the culture of violence which unfortunately has not been taken up by activists who defend the rights of women in Indonesia. As with armies of occupation everywhere, sexual harassment of native women by thousands of Indonesian soldiers has been unavoidable. In the course of my observations, I have noted two kinds of reactions from the local population to the sexual pressures from soldiers who are stationed there. Some simply succumb to the sexual desires of the incomers and resign themselves to becoming the "kept women" of the armed men who are bivouacked in their kampungs. Without intending to insinuate, I call this the "Viqueque model", named after the place where this kind of response has been reported.

However, in some places, the local women are rigorously protected by their traditional community. Any soldier who is attracted to a woman must first go through a traditional ceremony (for instance, paying a dowry that is fixed by the prospective in-law family) and go through the marriage ceremony in church before being allowed to live with the woman he wants. Any soldier who refuses to undergo these customs and the church ceremony is reported to his superior officer in Dili, some of whom have been willing to discipline their subordinates who play around with women. This happens particularly in the eastern sector (district of Lautem) and the central-eastern sector (Manatuto and Baucau) where the Falintil guerrilla forces[7] are still a force to be reckoned with by ABRI[8]. This response which I call the "Lospalos model" because I heard about it on my way from Lospalos to Tutuala, has occasionally been able to prevent the soldiers there from using local women for their sexual satisfaction.[9]

It is very important to underlined the culture of violence in East Timor. I say this because some Indonesian intellectuals – among them, members of the academic staff at UKSW – actually believe that it will be easy to resolve conflicts over the exploitation of natural resources in East Timor simply by applying the provisions of the Law on Administration, the Law on the Environment and other Indonesian civic and military rules and regulations.

Another indirect consequence of the war in East Timor is the plunder of various natural resources, particular the livestock, by troops who are able to take advantage of the unsupervised transport network run by the civilian administration. The extremely severe livestock crisis felt during the first few years after "integration" had a number of negative effects. In the first place, bearing in mind the fact that livestock, especially bullocks and cows, are used to till the land according to the *renca* system which can also be found in West Timor, the yield from ricefields also fell. There are only a few places where it is possible for peasants to start tilling their land again; these are places where they are able to hire a tractor cheaply from a local non-governmental organisation such as the Etadep Foundation in the Loes River Valley on the boundary between the districts of Liquica, Ermera and Bobonaro and the Fatumaca College in the district of Baucau.

On the other hand, security disturbances in the Loes Valley have forced the peasants to change their past practice of letting their livestock graze freely in the valley bed. Now they have to keep what livestock they still have in cowsheds near their kampung on the mountain slopes. This has meant that they have had to cut down a part of the forest to clear grazing plots for each family's livestock. This new method has led to serious erosion in the hills around the Loes Valley [Metzner and Rumawas, 1991:16-17].

Another indirect consequence which is very obvious in countries that have lost large numbers of their menfolk because of war is that the burdens borne by the women have greatly increased, as they have had

to take over as the head of the household and make a livelihood to cater for the family's basic needs, as well as taking on additional jobs, along with their children, for productive purposes outside the home [Nysliweg 1988:10–12, 52–53]. School–children in East Timor are often to be seen tarmacking roads [Seran, 1989], something that is rarely seen in Indonesia. In recent years, teenagers have cut short their education at school (with the help of the Tiara Foundation) to go off and work in factories in Indonesia; some of these youngsters are employed by PT Kanindotex, near Salatiga. This kind of thing has little to do with improving their educational prospects and job opportunities and a lot to do with crushing the freedom aspirations which are so deep–rooted among the young people there.

Another indirect consequence and one that is most conspicuous in East Timor is the discrimination in the construction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, bridges and harbours in regions where armed conflict is still taking place, for instance in the eastern sectors of Baucau and Lautem. In the relatively more "peaceful" regions such as Ermera and Maliana and from the Maliana border region to Suai, the condition of the roads is deplorable and there are hardly any bridges for crossing the rivers (see Map 1).

Finally, there are the consequences that have to be borne by people outside East Timor, in Indonesia and abroad. In Indonesia, communities that live in the vicinity of army barracks which accommodate troops that have just returned from East Timor must share in bearing the stress suffered by members of the armed forces. For instance, there is a maximum speed–limit for traffic in the vicinity. The broader community must also subsidise the war in East Timor by bearing the costs of the "Seroja" orphanages that care for children of soldiers killed in East Timor [see, for instance, *Sinar Harapan*, 16 June, 1985]. The armed forces needed budget to cover the costs of the war in East Timor has reduced the share of the state budget allocated to education and health [see Kutjoro–Jakti and Simatupang 1990].

In Australia and Portugal, people now have to look after the 5,000 refugees from East Timor. This has had consequences in the provision of separate settlements in these countries.

These are, in brief, the primary, secondary and tertiary consequences of the war that has raged for the past 18 years in East Timor, at first in the form of open warfare, and more recently in what has become known as "low intensity conflict". At a time when environmental scientists have begun to pay special attention to the ecological consequences of war or *ecocide* in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, it is high time for Indonesian academics to investigate the ecocide that is happening in our own "backyard", East Timor.

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The next environmental problem which is more limited in scale and its implications is the ownership of large tracts of land by just a handful of people. As so often happens in agrarian societies, a very lopsided pattern of land ownership leads to a situation where the majority work as agricultural labourers or become small–scale peasants. This "forces" the majority of poor peasants to scratch out a living on mountain slopes where no–one claims ownership and results in erosion. So, how has this condition inherited from the days of Portuguese colonialism, fared during the era of the Indonesian occupation?

We first need to understand the structure of land ownership in East Timor during the Portuguese colonial era when vast tracts of land were in the hands of four main groups. First there was the *mestico* group (from the mixed marriages between Portuguese and local inhabitants), the descendants of political activists who were exiled to Portugal's most easterly colony. One example is the *fazenda* (large plantation) owned by the Carrascalao family in the border region between Liquica and Ermera. By giving them large tracts of land, it was the intention to dilute the radicalism of the *deportados* so that they would not instigate local rebellions against Portugal.

The second group of large land–owners was a number of kings or *liurai* who had served the Portuguese well. One example is the King of Atsabe, Guilherme Maria Goncalves, one of the first chairmen of the pro–integration political party, Apodeti. Besides these private land–owners there was the state companies

Livestock Population in East Timor 1976-1987

Tabel 1. Perkembangan Populasi Ternak di Timor Timur, 1976-1987

| Jenis ternak | Jumlah ekor ternak | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | 1987 |
| Sapi - Cows | 70.200 | 30.700 | 49.800 | 53.593 |
| Kerbau Bullocks | 90.600 | 24.600 | 35.200 | 36.548 |
| Kuda Horses | 95.400 | 15.500 | 23.400 | 23.890 |
| Kambing Goats | 188.200 | 26.400 | 73.900 | 79.053 |
| Domba Sheep | 27.700 | 11.200 | 27.500 | 28.309 |
| Babi Pigs | 121.900 | 64.000 | 190.400 | 204.062 |
| Ayam Chickens | 724.500 | 218.800 | 417.900 | 453.204 |
| Bebek Ducks | 31.500 | 18.100 | 29.400 | 30.408 |

Sumber: Soesastro, 1991: 212; *Hidup*, 27 November 1988: 9.

Coffee export from East Timor 1973-1988

Tabel 2: Perkembangan Ekspor Kopi dari Timor Timur, 1973-1988

| Tahun | Jumlah Ekspor (Ton) |
|---|---|
| 1973 | 5,584 |
| 1978 | 1,329 |
| 1979 | 2,510 |
| 1980 | 5,597 |
| 1981 | 3,547 |
| 1982 | 2,968 |
| 1983 | 4,600 |
| 1984 | 2,995 |
| 1985 | 3,195 |
| 1988 | 6,000 |

Sumber: Soesastro, 1991: 224.


9°15'
PANTEMACASSAR
P.ATAURO
S E L A T W E T A R
124°15'
8°30'
DILI
MANATUTO
LIQUICA
AILEU
GLENO
MALIANA
AINARO
SAME
SUAI
T I
L A U T
9°30'
125°30'




**Peta 1: Kualitas Jalan di Timor Timur**
(Sumber: Kanwil BPN Propinsi Timor Timur)

purchase and export of coffee from East Timor [Taylor, 1991:125–127].

And now, a subsidiary of PT Batara Indra Group, PT Watu Besi Raya, has been able to grab hold of the lion's share of civil engineering projects in East Timor. The same group of companies also set up a sugar–beet and sugar–mill company in the district of Lautem and built a new harbour in Kom, also in Lautem, though the company has fallen on bad times since the chief patron of PT Batara Indra Group, Benny Murdani, was pensioned off by Suharto. Before that happened, the Batara Indra Group had expanded beyond the borders of East Timor with the construction of a tourism project, including a casino, in Christmas Island, an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean.

Besides violating various articles of the Land Reform Laws, the subsidiaries of the PT Batara Indra Group also appear to be able to ignore the provisions of the Law on the Environment, in particular the Presidential Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (AMDAL)[11]. How then is it possible to protect the sustainability of the sandalwood forests the products of which are monopolised by PT Scent Indonesia? How to minimise the effects of quarrying marble which is monopolised by PT Marmer Timor Timur? How to anticipate the ecological consequences of the sugarbeet plantations, the sugar mills and Kom Harbour which have been built by those companies in Lautem? And how to anticipate the ecological consequences of the new bypass that is being built by the same company in Manatuto?

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While large–scale land ownership is gathered speed in East Timor, small landholdings are shifting out of the hands of native peasants. Fortunately, this is happening in one or two districts only, because transmigration projects are still on a restricted scale in East Timor (see Map 4), centred in the districts of Maliana and Kovalima. There are also a few transmigration sites in the districts of Baucau and Viqueque, set up on the initiative of the Indonesian Council of Churches and the East Java Christian Church [Taylor, 1991:124]. But for the moment, let us concentrate our attention on Maliana and Kovalima.

The transmigration sites in these two districts have several features that distinguish them from the transmigration projects in Irian Jaya which several years ago attracted considerable international reaction [see Aditjondro, 1986]. Unlike the transmigration projects in Irian Jaya or in Kalimantan, the transmigration locations in Kovalima and Maliana have not been "carved" with a great deal of effort out of what was formerly primary forest, secondary forest, savannah or marshlands. On the contrary, the transmigration locations in Bobonaro and Kovalima were "pulled out of a hat" from ricefields that were formerly owned by local inhabitants. In one location in Bobonaro which includes the village of Memo, the ricefields were "acquired" from the local owners without a single cent being paid in compensation, according to the local peasants whom I interviewed. With not the slightest effort, the Balinese transmigrants – who are officially referred to in East Timor as "model farmers" – were very quickly able to reproduce their ricefields, drainage systems and temples, while at the same time widening the gap between their level of prosperity, culture and religion and those of the local inhabitants.

There is another aspect of transmigration in East Timor that distinguishes it from transmigration in Irian Raya. The transmigration sites in Merauke and Jayapura have not attracted much of a flow of migrants from Papua New Guinea but the transmigration projects in Bobonaro and Kovalima which have so quickly turned into economic growth areas, have become a great draw for spontaneous migrants from West Timor, particularly from the district of Belu. Almost every hour on my journey from Maliana, the capital of the district of Bobonaro, to Suai, the capital of Kovalima, I came across busloads or truckloads of passengers from Atambua, capital of Belu district. Since they are able to speak Tetum, which is their mother tongue, and adhere to the same religion as the majority of the people of East Timor, the migrants from Belu will soon intensify the struggle for land in the border region of East Timor, part of which is already controlled by transmigrants from Bali and East Java[12].

So, where are the peasants of the Tetum, Kemak and Bunak clans, the original inhabitants of the border

such as SAPT (*Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho*) which controlled thousands of hectares of land in East Timor [Guterres, 1991:56] Most of the land controlled by the Portuguese state companies were coffee plantations in the western sector (Liquica and Ermera)[10] and some *kelapa* (coconut) plantations in the east (Baucau and Lautem).

But the largest land-owning institution in East Timor was probably the Catholic Church. The lands on which the parish churches stood and the monasteries, some with their own boarding-schools (*collegios*), were surrounded by large tracts of ricefields and plantations to feed the communities in the parishes and the *collegios*. During the Portuguese era, the ricefields owned by the *collegio* in Maliana were tilled by the students as part of their skills training and discipline.

The pattern of land ownership at the end of the Portuguese era was so lopsided that it is not surprising that the leaders of the UDT -most of whom were the offspring of *deportados*, plus six *liurai* - and the Apodeti were very afraid when Fretilin was victorious in the elections of village heads that were held in the interior of the country in the second half of 1974. The party had campaigned on a political platform that stressed the need for land reform [see Taylor, 1991:33] which meant re-distributing the large land holdings that were in private hands as well as those in the hands of the Portuguese state companies. Fretilin had even said that surplus land owned by the Catholic Church would also be distributed to the landless peasants. This is why the leadership of the Catholic Church in Dili was initially anti-Fretilin.

It should be explained that this lopsided pattern of land ownership existed primarily in the western part of East Timor inhabited by clans of the *Kaladi* tribe who were the first to be pacified by the colonial troops, the priests and then by the political exiles from Portugal. The lower slopes of Mount Ramelau was also very suitable for the coffee plantations owned by the *mesticos*, the *liurai* and SAPT. Farther to the east, the population was mainly from the *Firaku* tribe where Portuguese influence was far weaker. The land here is nowhere near as fertile as in the west and was mostly owned by clans, with far fewer *fazenda* than in the west.

After "integration", the large plantations hardly changed at all. The large pro-Indonesian land-owners who had not fled abroad were able to keep hold of their *fazenda*s and those *fazenda*s that had been abandoned by their owners fell into the hands of a small group of East Timorese and Indonesians working for new rulers in Dili. The plantation formerly owned by SAPT was taken over by a private company, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations, which is run by a group of businessmen who enjoyed the backing of the new rulers in Dili. In addition, there was a new group of landowners not in the coffee business such as for instance the sandalwood oil-refining company, PT Scent Indonesia, which has been granted concessions in all the sandalwood forests throughout East Timor (see Map 2). PT Marmer Timor Timur (East Timor Marble Co.) was granted the monopoly over all marble quarrying in East Timor (see Map 3).

Some land re-distribution did occur in villages that had previously been owned by one or two *mestico* families. This was carried out by the UKSW project in Vatuvou village, sub-district Maubara, district of Liquica, with the help of the National Land Agency (BPN) office in East Timor. But on the whole, absentee landownership by large-scale companies, in contravention of the provisions and the spirit of the Land Reform Acts No. 5/1960 and No 56/1962, has grown enormously under the Indonesian government. So, we can anticipate that the land question will intensify, along with civil and criminal cases arising from land conflicts.

Moreover, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations which monopolises the coffee business, PT Scent Indonesia which monopolises the sandalwood-oil business and PT Marmer Timor Timur which monopolises marble quarrying, are all subsidiaries of the PT Batara Indra Group which monopolises almost the entire economy of East Timor. This holding company grew out of PT Denok Hernandes International which was set up by the three officers who commanded *Operation Seroja* (the name of the operation mounted to invade and conquer East Timor, Tr.) - Benny Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Sahala Rajagukguk - with the help of a small clique of Chinese businessmen, to finance military operations in East Timor by monopolising the




Peta 2: Penyebaran Kayu Cendana di Timor Timur
(Sumber: Kanwil BPN Propinsi Timor Timur)




Peta 3: Cadangan-cadangan bahan tambang di Timor Timur
(Sumber: Kanwil BPN Propinsi Timor Timur)




Peta 4: Persebaran lokasi - lokasi transmigrasi di Timor Timur
(Sumber: Kanwil BPN Propinsi Timor Timur)

region of East Timor, supposed to go? There is less and less land available at the foot of Mount Ramelau because the upper slopes have been taken over by coffee plantations and the business activities of Bugis–Makassar traders who dominate the markets along a north–south axis running from Dili to Same.

As for the lowland peasants living along the coast of Kovalima, they face a new challenge from economic activities to support the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap – which I will discuss below. But first, there is another environment problem which needs our attention, namely the re–settlement of inhabitants in the guided villages and the style of housing built by the territorial battalions in East Timor.

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The style of traditional housing in Lospalos which, since Portuguese times up to the Indonesian era, has been regarded as "representative" of the region as a whole is in fact one of seven types of traditional architecture in East Timor (see Map 5 and Graphic 1). According to Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes [1987:16–17], these seven styles are: (1) the Bobonaro style, (2) the Maubisse style, (3) the Baucau style, (4) the Lautem style, (5) the Viqueque style, (6) the Suai style, and (7) the Oecussi style. These seven styles represent three quite distinct ecosystems or topographies. The first two, Bobonaro and Maubisse represent settlements in the mountainous regions. The next two, Baucau and Lautem, represent settlements in the upper plateaux, while the last three – Viqueque, Suai and Oecussi – represent settlements in the lowlands.

These seven traditional architectural styles are each the result of inter–action over hundreds of years between the native inhabitants and their environment. The materials used for construction, the configuration of the kampungs and the specifics of the architecture of each building in the kampungs fitted into their system of beliefs, social structure, the ecosystem in which they tilled the soil, hunted or secured their livelihoods in different fashions, as Cinatti and his co–authors described in detail in their study [1987]. It is therefore no coincidence that a region that is "only" 18,898 square kilometres (including the enclave, Oecussi, Atauro Island and Jaco Island) should have produced such a stunning variety of traditional architecture, with Lospalos architecture displaying such exquisite carvings – on a par with *tongkonon* in South Sulawesi, and the architecture of Baucau and Lautem which has a striking similarity to *silimo* found in Baliem Valley [see Aditjondro, 1989:12].

Today, East Timor's traditional architecture has been slowly ravaged by the removal of populations from the interior of the country to the guided villages that are spread across a number of areas (see Map 6). These guided villages are the "inheritance" of the resettlement programme for the inhabitants who left the mountains along with the resettlement of Fretilin and Falintil guerrillas who surrendered or were captured in the late 1970s. This flood of people who left the mountains was accompanied by intensive bombardment by the AURI (Indonesian air force) squadron of OV–10 Broncos from 1976 – 1979. The bombing campaign was very effective indeed because the planes were able to carry out raids flying as low as 100 – 200 metres, unloading their napalm bombs that so terrified by the guerrillas [*Angkasa*, January 1993, 41–42].

Not only do the guided villages fail to use the traditional local architecture, they also have no surrounding plots of land to provide for the needs of a population that suddenly exploded in size. This is the reason for the extraordinarily high death toll in those guided villages which has been compared with the tragedy in Biafra [Taylor, 1991:92:99].

After resettling the people who had come down from the mountains, the "aid" provided for constructing houses for the population continued to flow. This was an integral part of the aid from the territorial battalions which was speeded up during the time Brigadier–General Rudolf Warouw was commander of *Kolakops*. This programme also failed to heed the cultural requirements of the native inhabitants which had produced a blending with a variety of ecosystems and topographies. Just like the uniforms worn by

the soldiers who built the houses, all the houses which they built for the East Timorese people were exactly alike. This had nothing whatsoever to do with encouraging independent initiatives by the people and everything to do with building as many houses as possible in the shortest possible time. Most important of all, all the houses were built along the main roads so as to make it easier for the security forces to keep an eye on the population. The surveillance aspect was clearly far more important than making sure that the inhabitants would be able to go to their gardens and forests[13]. As a result, in many places, the only useful thing that the infantry battalions did under their programme of "territorial guidance" has been the provision of water facilities. Many of the houses that were built now stand vacant.

*****

Finally, we come to the fifth environmental problem which is as yet still a potential problem, the impact of the drilling and distribution of oil and natural gas from the Timor Gap. The first offshore drilling began last December by the U.S. company USX Marathon Oil, a company with capital from Australia, Indonesia, Britain, Brazil and Egypt. Ten other companies are ready to follow in Marathon's footsteps, Royal Dutch Shell (Dutch/British), Chevron (U.S.), BHP Petroleum (Australia), Woodside Petroleum (Australia) and its subsidiary, Santos Ltd, Nippon Oil (Japan), Philips Petroleum (U.S.), Sagas Co (Australia), Petroz NL (Australia), Enterprise Oil plc (Britain) and Western Mining Co. These eleven companies stand ready to sink 45 exploration oil-wells in a seismic area that extends across 52,100 square kilometres [*Publico*, 12 December 1991; *Cahaya Siang*, 3 October 1992; *Kompas*, 6 November 1992].

Various groups have reacted quite differently to the current "Timor Gap fever". Portugal which is still recognised by the UN as the administering power in East Timor, has taken Australia to the World Court in The Hague [Nairn, 1991]. In Australia, José Ramos-Horta, on behalf of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) has taken the Australian government to the Australian High Court. Meanwhile business circles in Australia and Kupang (Indonesia) are fighting hard for their respective regions and companies to become the supply base for the drilling of oil and natural gas. Of an evening, the flashing lights of the oil platforms that have been docked in Tenau harbour are clearly visible from the town of Kupang. During the day, there is a mad scramble to buy up the land of people living in Bobok district, near Tenau harbour, because the provincial government of Nusatenggara Timur is actively promoting the bid for Bolok to become the supply base for oil-drilling in the Timor Gap, as well as to build an industrial complex covering 1,600 hectares [*Pos Kupang*, 3 June 1993]

Meanwhile, things are still quiet in Suai, the capital of the district of Kovalima in East Timor. But beneath these calm waters, government circles and the East Timorese anticipate an oil boom from the Timor Gap. Three new bridges over the dried-up rivers leading into Suai seem to be standing ready for a new influx of heavy equipment (or could it be for transmigrants?). One local priest whom I interviewed expressed the fear that offshore oil-drilling would include drilling along the south coast of East Timor which also has rich oil reserves (see Map 3). "When people dig for water-wells, they often find oil," he said. He is very much afraid that the land owned by the local inhabitants, much of which has been gradually taken over by the transmigrants and the spontaneous migrants will now be taken over again for oil-drilling.

Perhaps, the coastline along the south coast of East Timor will not be drilled for oil even though oil-wells dug during the Portuguese era are still visible in Suai Loro. But, as in West Timor, various economic activities to back up oil and natural gas drilling, can be expected to emerge in these southern coastal districts. Some people have already suggested that Suai be given a share in exploration activities for the Timor Gap by taking advantage of Holbells airfield which is large enough for Transall C-160 and Hercules C-130 planes to land, as a stepping-stone to Darwin in Australia [Wibowo,1993).

Measures should be taken to anticipate the impact of exploration for oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap on the coastal environment in south East Timor so that local inhabitants are not provoked into rebelling. For as long as they continue to be regarded as Indonesian citizens, they should have a veto on all economic activities that could conceivably be harmful or disruptive to their interests, in conformity with

Peta 5: Penyebaran tujuh pola arsitektur tradisional Timor Timor yang utama
(Sumber: Cinatti, de Almeida, Mendes, 1987: 56)

**Geographical spread of the seven types of traditional East Timorese housing**



| SINAIS | REGIÃO | PLANTAS E ALÇADOS | ALTITUDE |
|---|---|---|---|
| | BOBONARO |  | MONTANHA |
| | MAUBISSE |  | MONTANHA |
| | BAUCAU |  | COLINAS PLANALTO |
| | LAUTEM |  | COLINAS PLANALTO |
| | VIQUEQUE |  | PLANÍCIE |
| | SUAI |  | PLANÍCIE |
| | OCUSSI |  | PLANÍCIE |

Skema 1: Tujuh pola arsitektur tradisional Timor Timor yang utama
(Sumber: Cinatti, de Almeida, Mendes, 1987: 57




Peta 6: Perpindahan penduduk dan lokasi desa-desa binaan di Timor Timur
(Sumber: Kanwil BPN Propinsi Timor Timur)

the provisions of Point XX of the Law on Disturbances, 1926 [Salindeho, 1989:43–47]

Oil and natural gas exploration off the south coast of East Timor may also have harmful consequences for fishermen and others involved in maritime activities. It so happens that, as in West Timor, the waters off the south coast of East Timor are known as "the man's sea" (*Mar de Homem*) because of the huge waves that lash the shore, as compared to the Ombai Strait in the north which is known as the "the woman's sea" (*Mar de Mulher*). This is why these waters have never been attractive for East Timorese fishermen. But even so, there is always the danger of tanker accidents occurring or oil spills from tankers that sail through the Timor Sea, events that are routine in the Malaka Strait. Environmental activists in East Timor as well as in West Timor should already be anticipating such possibilities.

Salatiga, 4 August 1993.

1. An introductory working paper given at a conference on the environment held by LPM – UKSW on UKSW campus 6.8.93.

2. East Timor had been hidden behind a veil of secrecy by the Indonesian government from the beginning of December 1975 until December 1988, when a more "open" approach to politics was initiated. However, to this day there are a number of things which cannot be photographed even by Indonesian nationals themselves. This is a sure sign of the different status attributed to East Timor, compared with other regions which are also claimed as being provinces of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. For that reason I am of my opinion that democratic elements in Indonesia should make extra efforts to lift this veil of secrecy.

3. One: based on Indonesia's historical claim to the former colonial territories of the Dutch East Indies. Two: based on the knowledge that what is known as the "Balibo Declaration" for integration with Indonesia was drafted by only five East Timorese politicians in a hotel in Bali under pressure from special military intelligence units (Opsus), to be handed over to the late Foreign Affairs Minister Adam Malik in Atambua (East Indonesia) as a reaction to the declaration of independence made by the Democratic Republic of East Timor in the presence of the people of East Timor in Dili, on the 29.11.75. Three: based on the fact that the decision taken by the People's Consultative Council of East Timor which requested integration with Indonesia was only attended by 7 out 35 *liurai* (traditional chiefs) in East Timor. Four: based on the fact that international law does not recognise East Timor as being legally a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Five: based on the constitutional duty of every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia to uphold the right of self–determination for all peoples (first article in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution – UUD 1945). Six: based on the fact that the independence movement in East Timor has not yet been eradicated, moreover the movement is continuously being regenerated. Seven: based on the fact that a referendum based on international principles has yet to be held in East Timor, in which the desire of the majority of the East Timorese to integrate with Indonesia can be confirmed. Bearing the above seven points in mind, I continue to regard "East Timor" as a separate political entity which is not part of the political entity known as "Indonesia".

4. As someone who wrote and edited reports about East Timor for *Tempo* magazine, I am able to point to an error contained in the caption of the photograph, which according to the credit was taken

by one of *Tempo*'s own staff. In fact the photograph, taken by former *Tempo* journalist Sjahrir Wahab, shows Indonesian troops landing in Atapupu in West Timor (Indonesia), in advance of the invasion of East Timor. All the troops which were landed with LST ships of that kind insignia indicating rank and regiment removed, to support the impression that they were civilian volunteers landed to help the anti-communist front in East Timor. Both the invasion of Dili on 7.12.75 and the previous attacks on towns bordering with West Timor, such as Balibo, Maliana and Bobonaro, were closed to all Indonesian journalists, including *Tempo*. It is therefore not possible for *Tempo* to possess a photograph of the *landing in East Timor* taken by one of *Tempo*'s own journalists.

5. The decline of coffee production in East Timor cannot only be attributed to the destruction of the coffee plantations by the ravages of war. A number of other factors must be taken into consideration, namely the labour force for the plantations became increasingly scarce; limitations imposed on the movements of the coffee pickers who in the past had been free to travel from region to region according to harvest times; price controls imposed by the new authorities in East Timor; at one period the International Coffee Organization (ICO), which sets the export quotas for its member nations, did not officially recognise East Timor as a part of Indonesia, with the result that this particular region was not allocated an export quota (Soesastro, 1991:210–212, 223–227).

6. The most recent example of these false reports is that of the many people who have been forced to take the "blood oath" (*sumpah darah*) as a sign of the disbandment of clandestine organistions in the regency of Ainaro and Aileu, which included high school students (SMP) as well as civil servants who it should be noted included Golkar cadres and members of the official Indonesian national youth commission (KNPI). An older example is that of the torture and later imprisonment of a government employee, Dominggus S., in several prisons in East Timor, Bali and in the end in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta for a period of 11 years after he had been involved with the defence of a number of families which were to be forcibly moved from their homes in Dili.

7. The Indonesian mass media still often mistakenly calls the guerrilla movement Fretilin. In fact, on the initiative of Xanana Gusmao, since 1986 the East Timor Liberation Force or *Falintil* (*Force Armada de Liberacao Timor Leste*), was released from being under the Fretilin hierarchy and changed from being the paramilitary force of a particular political party, to being a unit of the national armed forces, directly under the highest command of the CNRM (*Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Maubere*), or the National Council of Maubere Resistance, whose members include all East Timorese who struggle for the independence of East Timor.

8. On Wednesday 17th March 1993, persons who were identified as being "the remnants of GPK" by the army information centre shot dead two members of the Students' Regiment (*Menwa*) and two members of the armed forces near the town of Lospalos (*Kompas*, 19.3.93). What was not reported by the Indonesian press was that two days later,

six members of the armed forces were shot dead in the same area. According to my sources in Lospalos, there were many such occurrences during the first half of 1993.

9. According to Franz Fanon, the satisfaction of sexual needs by soldiers of an occupying force with the women of the region that they occupy does not only represent the fulfillment of biological needs. It also represents an attempt by the soldiers to reinforce their self-confidence, undermined by the opposition to their presence which they face from the local populace, especially in the form of vengeance for not succeeding in breaking the resistance of the local men. See Fanon, 1967.

10. Coffee plantations were first established in Ermera by SAPT in 1899 (Taylor, 1991:11).

11. Foreign loan projects for East Timor are also free from the obligation to carry out proper environmental impact assessment. For example, the project to eradicate malaria via the wide-spread spraying of DDT, which was financed by loans from US-AID at the beginning of the 1980s, even though an environmental impact assessment was a compulsory element of US-AID procedure.

12. In the village of Casabau (subdistrict of Tilomar, regency of Kovalima), it was reported four years ago that 500 Ha of land belonging to indigenous East Timorese was grabbed by Javanese transmigrants in the region of Salele (*Fakta*, 1 May 1989:54) According to what I was told by an informant, that group of transmigrants at first declared themselves Catholic, but after having settled in Salele, they returned to Islam.

13. In several places, for example in the regencies of Lautem and Baucau, the residents have to report to the local military post before they go to their garden or to the forest, and then report once again on their return. In addition to the changes in the location of the village, making them close to the main road, this type of security intervention can give rise to ecological implications which are 'beneficial', for example decreasing the logging of yellow sandalwood for wood carving for which Lospolos is famous. On the other hand, intervention also results in ecological consequences which are detrimental, for example, lessening the frequency of weeding in the gardens resulting in an increase in growth of imperata.

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